DMZ
Created: 2025-11-25 Tags: networking dmz security architecture perimeter
Description
DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) is a physical or logical subnet that sits between an organization’s internal network and untrusted external networks (typically the Internet). It acts as a security buffer zone hosting public-facing services.
Key Concepts
Purpose
- Host public-facing services (web, email, DNS)
- Protect internal network from direct internet exposure
- Provide additional security layer
- Isolate compromised services
Typical DMZ Architecture
Internet
↓
External Firewall (Public IP)
↓
DMZ (Semi-trusted zone)
- Web Server
- Mail Server
- DNS Server
- FTP Server
↓
Internal Firewall
↓
Internal Network (Trusted zone)
- User workstations
- Database servers
- File servers
- Domain controllers
DMZ Designs
Single Firewall DMZ
Internet ← Firewall (3+ interfaces) → DMZ
↓
Internal Network
- Cost-effective
- Single point of failure
- Less secure
Dual Firewall DMZ (Recommended)
Internet ← Firewall 1 → DMZ ← Firewall 2 → Internal
- Two-layer defense
- More secure
- Higher cost
- Breach containment
Screened Subnet
Internet ← Router ← Firewall → DMZ ← Firewall → Internal
- Maximum security
- Complex configuration
- Highest cost
Services in DMZ
Typical DMZ Hosts
- Web servers: Public websites
- Mail gateways: Email relay
- DNS servers: External DNS resolution
- VPN concentrators: Remote access termination
- Reverse proxies: Application delivery
- FTP servers: File transfer
- Jump boxes: Administrative access
What NOT to Put in DMZ
- Internal user workstations
- Database servers (unless read-only replicas)
- Domain controllers
- Internal file servers
- Sensitive data repositories
Security Rules
Firewall Rules Example
External Firewall (Internet → DMZ)
Allow: HTTP/HTTPS → Web Server
Allow: SMTP → Mail Gateway
Allow: DNS → DNS Server
Deny: All other traffic
Internal Firewall (DMZ → Internal)
Allow: Mail Gateway → Internal Mail Server (limited)
Allow: Web Server → Database Server (specific ports only)
Deny: All other traffic (default deny)
Internal → DMZ
Allow: Admin workstation → DMZ (SSH/RDP management)
Allow: Internal users → Web proxy in DMZ
Strict logging and monitoring
Security Best Practices
DMZ Hardening
- Minimal services: Only necessary ports open
- Patching: Regular security updates
- Monitoring: Enhanced logging and alerting
- IDS/IPS: Intrusion detection in DMZ
- Access control: Strict firewall rules
- Segmentation: Separate DMZ for different services
- No direct routing: DMZ should not route between Internet and Internal
Defense in Depth
- Application-level firewalls
- Host-based firewalls on DMZ servers
- Regular vulnerability scanning
- Penetration testing
- Security information correlation
Modern Alternatives
Cloud DMZ
- Using cloud provider security groups
- VPC (Virtual Private Cloud) with subnets
- Cloud-native firewall services
- Similar concepts, cloud implementation
Zero Trust Model
- Moving away from perimeter-based security
- Micro-segmentation instead of DMZ
- Identity-based access control
- Still useful for service isolation
Related Topics
- Perimeter Security
- Network Segmentation
- VLAN
- Firewall (if created)
- Defense in Depth
- Zero Trust Architecture
- VPN
- Public vs Private IP Addresses
Common Mistakes
- Placing database servers in DMZ
- Same firewall rules for DMZ as internal
- Allowing DMZ-to-DMZ communication without control
- Not monitoring DMZ traffic
- Treating DMZ as trusted zone
- Poor patch management on DMZ hosts
Compliance Considerations
PCI DSS
- Requires separation of cardholder data environment
- DMZ for payment applications
- Strict access controls
HIPAA
- ePHI isolation requirements
- DMZ for healthcare portals
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